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Abstract 
 
The U.S. national response to the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks accelerated the 
adoption and refinement of a new repertoire of protest policing we call ‘strategic 
incapacitation’ now employed by law enforcement agencies nationwide to police protest 
demonstrations. The occupation movement in 2011 was the most significant social 
movement to utilize transgressive protest tactics in the U.S. in the last 40 years and posed 
a substantial challenge to law enforcement agencies. This research seeks to better 
understand the implementation of strategic incapacitation tactics through a detailed 
analysis of the policing of the first two months of Occupy Wall Street (OWS) protests in 
New York City. Original data for this study are derived from two week-long field 
observations made in New York City during the first and second month anniversaries of 
the OWS occupation in Zuccotti Park. These are supplemented by activist interviews, 
activist accounts posted on OWS websites, Facebook pages, and Twitter feeds as well as 
news reports, official police documents, press releases, and interviews with legal 
observers.  
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Introduction 
The ongoing U.S. occupation movement is the most significant social movement 
to utilize transgressive protest tactics in the US in the last 40 years. The occupation 
movement formally began in September 2011 when activists established the first 
‘Occupy Wall Street’ encampment in Zuccotti Park, a half-acre site in the financial 
district of lower Manhattan. Activists had gathered there to protest against many things, 
including: corporate influence in American politics; the inadequate federal response to 
issues stemming from the 2008 financial crisis; and the growing income inequality gap. 
The rapid diffusion of occupation protests over the next two months challenged local 
police agencies in ways not experienced since the 1970s.  
During the1960s and 1970s authorities utilized a policing strategy called 
‘escalated force’ the excesses of which generated enduring public controversy over the 
process of policing protest (and other) events. Five enduring complaints against police 
agencies arose in that era and remain controversial to this day. They are: disrespect for 
protester civil liberties and rights, intolerance of disruptions to public order, excessive use 
of force, indiscriminant arrests sometimes of bystanders, and ineffective communication 
with civilians. 
Appropriately these long-standing issues have garnered a great deal of media 
attention and public commentary. Indeed, controversies surrounding these enduring 
grievances comprise a central theme in ‘old’ and ‘new’ media coverage of Occupy Wall 
Street (OWS) protests. Yet, attention to such enduring issues often overlooked three 
emerging issues arising from the now routine use of a policing repertoire called ‘strategic 
incapacitation.’ They are conflicts over the use of space both public and private, 
contentious efforts to control the production and dissemination of information, and 
unprecedented levels of surveillance. 
 
Repertoires of protest control 
The collection of tactics utilized by social movements and protesters have long 
been conceptualized as repertoires of contention whose contours change over time in 
response to social, political and cultural factors (Tilly 1978, Della Porta and Reiter 1998, 
Della Porta and Reiter 2006). Similarly, the collection of police tactics employed at a 
given point in time can be usefully viewed as repertoires of protest control. Like 
repertoires of contention (Tilly 1978, Tarrow 1995, p. 91), police protest control 
repertoires reflect what police know how to do, are technically feasible and institutionally 
sanctioned.  
 
Repertoires predominant prior to 11 September 2001 
Changes in repertoires of protest control employed in the U.S. since the end of 
World War II are well documented (Gillham 2011). Until the 1970s, the predominant 
police response to protest has been called ‘escalated force,’ a repertoire of tactics 
revolving around the use of arrests, beatings, tear gas, bullets, and other weapons meant 
to quell protests by inflicting pain and suffering. The tactics of escalated force flowed 
from the belief by the state that protest was an illegitimate form of political expression. 
The illegitimacy of protest also attached itself to the purveyors of the tactic. Thus, police 
generally refused to meet with protest organizers to discuss planned or ongoing 
demonstrations (McPhail et al. 1998). Police reliance on escalated force faded in the 
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1970s and 1980s, to be replaced by a new repertoire rooted in a different philosophy in 
which protest was viewed as a legitimate means of political expression and that the role 
of police was to protect First Amendment rights as it maintained social order.  
Under what has been called ‘negotiated management,’ the repertoire of protest 
policing took on a decidedly softer tone, emphasizing the joint planning with protesters of 
demonstrations, rallies, and even acts of non-violent civil disobedience. The cornerstone 
of negotiated management was a protest permitting process (McCarthy and McPhail 
1998). Required permits facilitated the collection of information about protesters and 
planned events by the police, opened lines of communication with protest groups, and 
helped police avoid on and in the job troubles like excessive force, brutality, burnout and 
high profile investigations of police conduct (PAJ Waddington 1994). It also reduced 
conflicts between police and protesters by making each better known and more 
predictable to the other (Noakes et al. 2005, Noakes and Gillham 2006, Gillham and 
Noakes 2007, Gillham 2011). 
 
Strategic Incapacitation 
Police use of negotiated management began to erode in the late 1990s and shift 
toward what scholars call ‘strategic incapacitation’ (Noakes and Gillham 2006, Gillham 
and Noakes 2007, Gillham 2011). Like previous policing repertoires, strategic 
incapacitation is rooted in a philosophy of social control, in this case in the ‘new 
penology’ of the 1980s (Feeley and Simon 1992, Garland 2001), which emphasizes 
preventing citizens from committing crime through risk management and the spatial 
redistribution and incapacitation of potential offenders. It is fundamentally different from 
“penal modernism” which held sway when negotiated management was adopted. The 
U.S. response to the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks accelerated the adoption and 
refinement of strategic incapacitation as the new strategy for policing protest and other 
‘threats to public order.’ 
Important research on what we call repertoires of protest control highlighted the 
differences between escalated force and negotiated management by comparing them on 
five dimensions of protest policing: respect of First Amendment rights, tolerance for 
community disruption, communication with demonstrators, and use of arrests and force 
(McPhail et al. 1998). The adoption of strategic incapacitation as an important but not 
exclusive repertoire of protest control and its widespread diffusion to the policing of 
protest across the U.S. points to three new dimensions of protest policing beyond the five 
mentioned above. Gillham (2011) referred to these as controlling space, surveillance, and 
information sharing. Their widespread use in recent years by law enforcement agencies 
has raised several significant, but as yet not well understood issues about the exercise of 
citizen rights to free assembly and speech in a democratic society (Vitale 2005, 2007, 
Boykoff 2007, Gillham and Noakes 2007, Fernandez 2008, Gillham 2011, Starr et al. 
2011). These issues stem from ongoing conflicts over the use of both public and private 
space, contention over efforts to control both the production and dissemination of 
information, and unprecedented levels of surveillance.  
Our aim here is to better understand the emerging social and civic implications of 
strategic incapacitation by examining the policing of the initial OWS occupation in New 
York City. In what follows, we describe events occurring in and around Zuccotti Park 
from the beginning of the OWS occupation there on 17 September 2011 through the first 
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two months of the occupation. Subsequently, our discussion emphasizes the conflicts 
between protesters and police over the control of spaces, contention over efforts to 
control both, the production and dissemination of information, and the widespread use of 
surveillance.  
 
Data 
Our data come from primary and secondary sources. First, we rely on field 
observations made in New York City 13-18 October, and 15-23 November, 2011 during 
the first and second month anniversaries of the original occupation that began in Zuccotti 
Park on 17 September. Large demonstrations marked both anniversaries. The one-month 
anniversary included two unpermitted marches, a several hour occupation of Times 
Square, a bank occupation, and a general assembly in Washington Square Park attended 
by over 1,000 people. The two-month anniversary included an effort to close down Wall 
Street through mass direct action, an occupation of the NYC subway system, an 
unpermitted march, a large permitted rally near New York City Hall and  march across 
the Brooklyn Bridge. Field observations provide rich data for analyzing strategic 
incapacitation and its impact on protesters. 
Second, we draw upon interviews with occupy activists and accounts posted on 
occupation websites, blogs, Facebook pages, and Twitter feeds; news reports; official 
police documents and press releases; and interviews with legal observers. In what follows 
we focus on police use of strategic incapacitation to control activists during key OWS 
protest events.  
 
Occupy Wall Street – Zuccotti Park, New York 
The Occupy Wall Street movement established its first encampment at Zuccotti 
Park in Lower Manhattan on 17 September 2011. Encampments diffused quickly to no 
fewer than 350 locations across the United States by the end of the second month (Caren 
and Gaby 2011). In that short span the OWS movement organized many events, from 
occupations of public and corporate spaces, to large rallies and marches, teach-ins, a 
general strike and closing of the port of Oakland, and occupations of foreclosed homes. 
These events often resulted in clashes with police and a strategy designed to incapacitate 
protesters and close down encampments. Authorities across the US routinely relied upon 
the repertoire of strategic incapacitation to police occupation movement protests. 
Analyzing such efforts in multiple locations lies beyond the scope of this research. 
Rather, in what follows we limit our analysis to key events that occurred in NYC—the 
movement’s epicenter—from 17 September 2011 until mid-November 2011. 
 
Occupy Wall Street – The first month (17 September – 17 October) 
The Zuccotti Park occupation begins (17 September) 
On 17 September 2011 700-plus OWS activists held the first New York City 
General Assembly (NYCGA) in Zuccotti Park just 2 blocks from Wall Street (Kroll 
2011, Schneider 2012). Initially, a general assembly (GA) had been planned   for Chase 
Manhattan Plaza (see Map 1), but was prevented by a police enforced hard-zone1 of 
barricades surrounding the plaza (Schneider 2012). Police were there in force having 
                                                      
1 Hard zones are areas where targets of protest gather and other places police deem off limits to 
everyone without proper credentials and security clearance (Gillham 2011). 
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been alerted in advance that activists would attempt to erect tents on Wall Street outside 
the headquarters of Chase (Vijayan 2011). Police established a ‘protest area’ or free-
speech zone2 next to the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), but activists refused to use 
it (Moynihan 2011a). Instead, implementing a backup plan, activists selected Zuccotti 
Park because of its proximity to Wall Street (Kroll 2011), which became their home and 
self-created free-speech zone until evicted by police in mid-November.  
[MAP 1 ABOUT HERE] 
The day the occupation started, hundreds of activists marched through the 
Financial District, and funneled into Zuccotti Park around 3:00 PM. Most activists 
walked from a gathering spot in Bowling Green Park near the iconic bronze bull, which 
had been surrounded by a hard zone of police and barricades. Others came through the 
Day of Rage social network (US Day of Rage 2011) or the Anonymous network's 
Operation Lighthouse (Anonymous 2011, Operation Lighthouse 2011).  
After activists entered Zuccotti Park, police officers clustered at the park's four 
corners (Schmitt, Taylor and Grief 2011). They barricaded the northern edge of the park 
earlier in the day, apparently to protect One Liberty Plaza across the street (Liberty Plaza 
is owned by Brookfield Properties which also owns Zuccotti Park). During a GA held a 
week earlier, activists agreed to decide to postpone a decision to set up an encampment 
until they had secured space on or near Wall Street. On the evening of September 17 in 
the first official NYCGA in Zuccotti Park activists decided to establish an encampment.  
As a result approximately 200 activists camped in the park that night. The occupation had 
begun (Democracy Now! 2011b). 
 
The first week (18-26 September) 
Over the next several days the numbers of occupiers  at any time fluctuated 
between 50-500 according to activist accounts (Schmitt and Taylor 2011, Taylor and 
Greif 2011). Working groups met and decisions were made to designate where differing 
logistical activities would occur within the park. For example, places were designated for 
a food station, sleeping area, information booth, art and poster space, library, media 
spokes desk, internet and live streaming stations, and a GA space (Moynihan 2012b). 
Nightly GAs brought together occupiers, activists not camping at the park, and 
bystanders. The NYCGA  defined itself as ‘an open, participatory and horizontally 
organized process through which we are building the capacity to constitute ourselves in 
public as autonomous collective forces within and against the constant crises of our 
times.’ (NYCGA 2012). Assemblies lasted 2 to 5 hours depending on the agenda and 
amount of discussion regarding specific proposals.  
During the first days of the occupation police created a perimeter of metal 
barricades around the park. Barricades placed at the curb prevented movement from the 
sidewalk into the street except at intersections. Police clustered at the intersections and 
deployed along a thin blue line encircling the park's perimeter, but inside the metal 
fencing. Barricades provided visual and physical barriers marking what police recognized 
as a free-speech zone, although they implemented this after protesters entered the park, 
not pre-emptively. Surveillance at the park was both visible and less visible. Visible 
                                                      
2 Free-speech zones are areas where police decide in advance to allow legal protest to occur, and 
are increasingly located far away from the targets of protest like a political convention (Gillham 
2011). 
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surveillance included a 25-foot mobile ‘Watch Tower’ with a 2-person observation booth 
equipped with darkened windows, flood lights, video cameras, a permanent closed-circuit 
television (CCTV) camera positioned near the park, and a mobile surveillance vehicle 
with a camera affixed to a 20-foot boom. All cameras were directed at the park (Turse 
2011). There were also the eyes and ears of uniformed police stationed around the park 
and Technical Assistance Response Unit (TARU) officers responsible for gathering 
intelligence and documenting protester/police interactions, especially when 
confrontations or arrests were likely. The New York City Police Department (NYPD) has 
the largest intelligence department in the country (NYPD Intelligence Division and 
Counter-Terrorism Bureau 2012) and a reputation for routinely infiltrating social 
movements and spying on citizens (New York Times n.d., Associated Press 2012), thus 
less visible surveillance likely occurred, with undercover police making surreptitious 
observations during working group and GA gatherings openly held by the activists.  
Where police consolidated the mass of information gathered remains undisclosed. 
We speculate that information gathered from the mobile units and TARU officers was 
routed through a mobile communications vehicle parked one block east of the 
encampment. Possibly the intelligence video gathered were routed to the NYPD 
Intelligence Division and Counter-Terrorism Bureau headquarters or perhaps to the 
NYPD Joint-Operation Center located at One Police Plaza. It might have been directed to 
all these places. Given the proximity of the encampment to the financial district, it is 
likely that information was downloaded to the Lower Manhattan Security Coordination 
Center located a few blocks South of Wall Street (Greenemeier 2011, Martens 2011).  
Modeled in part on London’s ‘Ring of Steel’ the $150 million center relies on a 
security apparatus stretching across the financial district (Buckley 2007, Pelley 2011). 
The center, constructed partially with U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
funds protects the financial district and receives  the real time information gathered from 
over 2,000 CCTV cameras which reportedly track every square-foot of public space in 
the financial district (Greenemeier 2011). Intelligence analysts watch the footage on a 
wall of large computer monitors, filtered through a multi-million dollar computer running 
artificial intelligence software. The computer is able to analyze real time information, 
such as how long a group of people have remained stationary on a street corner, and 
warns analysts of the situation. Analysts can tell the computer what they want it to 
identify out of the tremendous amount of video data being collected in real time or they 
can ask the computer to reconstruct scenarios using archived video data (Pelley 2011, 
Greenemeier 2011). Analysts involved in the center come from the NYPD, security 
specialists employed by banks in the Financial District, and on occasion the FBI (Buckley 
2007, Pelley 2011). 
During the first week of the encampment the NYCGA made several decisions 
significant for the authorities, including that activists would stay in the park indefinitely, 
that they would engage in direct actions and other activities without seeking permits from 
police, that they would not liaison with police, and that they would defend the park from 
eviction (NYGCA 2011b). The direct action working group scheduled a daily ritual of 
unpermitted marches (NYGCA 2011b), and police also initiated a daily ritual entering the 
park to make random arrests or take down tents or tarps erected the previous night 
(Schneider 2011b). 
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Marching to Union Square (24 September, Saturday) 
Several hundred activists celebrated the occupation's one-week anniversary by 
marching without a permit from the Zuccotti encampment north towards Union Square 
(Schneider 2011a) where a large contingent of police confronted them at Fifth Avenue 
and 14th Street. In preparation for making mass arrests, police surrounded with orange 
netting groups of protesters and a few reporters covering the event (Schneider 2011a). 
One senior officer was videoed pepper spraying two women activists contained in the 
netting (Goldstein 2011). Over 80 people were arrested in the vicinity. Some of those 
arrested were reportedly on the sidewalk and unaware that they had broken any laws. 
Marchers able to avoid being detained made their way into Union Square, then marched 
back to Zuccotti Park where they found it surrounded by scores of police. 
 
Mass arrest on the Brooklyn Bridge (1 October, Saturday) 
By 1 October mainstream and alternative media attention on the protests had 
increased substantially. Until then, most of the information disseminated about the 
occupation and related protests came directly from movement blogging and Twitter 
activity. This began to change after the protests and harsh policing events of 24 
September garnered front page reporting in local papers and dramatic broadcast coverage 
on local TV news. In addition, ‘Live Streams’ was running 24/7 at Zuccotti Park and 
during protest marches beyond the park. Labor unions began endorsing the occupation, 
enough money was flowing into the NYCGA that the financial working group set up an 
account with a local credit union, and over 26 occupations had emerged nation-wide 
(NYCGA 2011c). The publicity apparently had an impact as the number of people 
visiting the park and participating in the nightly GAs began to swell. On Saturday 1 
October, another large march was organized to mark the second-week anniversary of the 
occupation, this time across the Brooklyn Bridge. Approximately 2,000 activists left 
Zuccotti Park around 3 PM marching north towards the bridge. They carried handmade 
signs denouncing Wall Street and demanding jobs, and silk-screened flags saying ‘We 
are the 99%’ (Lennard 2011, NYCGA 2011c). At the entrance to the bridge, a few 
activists moved into the roadway. News reports indicate that some of those who left the 
sidewalk had been chanting ‘off the sidewalks, into the streets’ and ‘Whose bridge? Our 
bridge!’ (Lennard 2011). No barriers prevented access from the sidewalk and some 
activists thought police were leading them along the road. Once the small group of 
activists entered the roadway, hundreds of others did the same. The majority of marchers 
however remained on the walkway.  
Traffic came to a halt because of the people on the roadway and the police 
blocked both ends of the march on the road using police lines and orange netting. Over 
the course of the next several hours, activists who had not deviated from the original 
march route watched on as police arrested more than 700 protesters (Baker, Moynihan, 
Nir 2011). The event was covered with live streaming and multiple activist videos that 
were quickly posted on the OWS website and on the websites of occupation protests in 
other localities (Occupy Wall Street 2011a).  
 
OWS first month anniversary (15 October, Saturday) 
15 October was a big day. Several events had been planned to celebrate the one-
month anniversary of the occupation and to participate in a related International Day of 
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Action. That morning, thousands of people buzzed around the park making signs, sharing 
food, and preparing to march. One march of approximately 400 people left around noon 
and proceeded to Washington Square Park near NYU where a GA was held to discuss 
whether to establish a second NYC occupation site there. Another group of activists 
marched to a nearby Citibank branch where they occupied the bank lobby as some 
activists attempted to close their accounts. A contingent of more than 20 police quickly 
arrived and arrested 25 activists. Some of those arrested reported having been pushed or 
pulled into the bank by police, causing them to involuntarily violate the law.  
Later that night thousands of people occupied Times Square. Police were prepared 
having set up a phalanx of barricades along the length of the square. The barricades 
created a corridor on Broadway Street that crossed and closed side streets. Police lined 
the length of the barricades on the street side, separating themselves from the protesters 
that were amassing on the sidewalk and in the intersections of the closed side streets. For 
two hours activist enthusiastically chanted slogans like ‘all day, all year, occupy 
everywhere!’ Later still, activists marched from Time Square back to Washington Square 
Park holding the second GA of the day with over 1,000 participants. After several-hours 
the GA was broken up by police threats to arrest anyone in the park after the midnight 
curfew went into effect.  
 
 OWS eviction and second month anniversary (11-17 November) 
U.S. mayors confer over OWS (11 November, Friday) 
As its two month anniversary approached, the occupy movement had spread 
across the country. Activists carried out many disruptive events most notably a general 
strike in Oakland that closed the port and resulted in a violent response by police (Wollan 
2011). In each occupation site, activists had created free-speech zones of their choosing, 
rather than where police might have done so had permits been requested. Occupation 
sites served as free spaces for discussion, deliberation, planning and as a staging ground 
for disruptive direct actions; but, on the morning of 11 November mayors from at least 18 
cities (including NYC, Oakland, Portland, and Philadelphia) conducted a conference call 
to discuss how to handle the OWS movement (Cherkis 2012). 
When asked what was discussed, the mayors provided contradictory explanations. 
Some also reluctantly admitted that police chiefs and other law enforcement personnel 
had participated (Cherkis 2012). The conflicting information provided and the secrecy 
around who was involved and what was said, makes reconstructing the conversation 
impossible. However, it is clear that just days after the conference call authorities across 
the country began evicting activists from encampments, in some cases violently.  
 
NYPD prepares to evict OWS activists by incapacitating the press (14 November, 
Tuesday) 
The eviction from Zuccotti Park of occupation participants by the NYPD 
proceeded in several phases beginning late in the afternoon of November 14 when the 
police apparently notified nearby vendors. Activists reported realizing that something 
was going to happen when street vendors operating adjacent to the park closed for the 
day and left all at once (Democracy Now! 2011a). An eviction notice distributed 
sometime after dark made clear the police intent to reclaim the space and regain control 
of the park. The notice ordered activists to remove their possessions from the park or 
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those items would be confiscated and taken to a sanitation department warehouse to be 
reclaimed at a later date. Thus, the police would be converting Zuccotti Park from an 
activists’ proclaimed free-speech zone that police had reluctantly respected into a hard–
zone off-limits to unauthorized personnel. 
As reporters stood on the sidewalk looking at the police and peering into the park, 
police requested to see press passes. Members of the press, including AP were then 
rounded up, escorted to a location several blocks away and out of sight of the park, and 
detained until after the eviction was completed and arrested activists were taken to jail. 
The next day during a press conference Mayor Bloomberg stated that restrictions were 
put on the reporters ‘to prevent a situation from getting worse and to protect members of 
the press’ (Stelter and Baker 2011). His remarks were probably accurate on the first 
point. Had media been allowed to report live on the eviction, hundreds if not thousands of 
sympathizers might have rushed to Zuccotti Park to help defend it, creating a chaotic and 
more difficult situation for police to control. However, removing the media also ensured 
that only competing police and the protester versions of what had happen would be made 
public.  
 
Police evict OWS activists (15 November, Tuesday 1:00 AM) 
Shortly after midnight on 15 November approximately 1,000 NYPD officers, 
many in riot gear, surrounded Zuccotti Park. Available video footage and news reports 
indicate a chaotic scene ensued and the details of what happened over the next few hours 
are sketchy.  
Our reconstruction of the event indicates the eviction began in earnest following 
the removal and detention of the media. Darkness vanished when police activated bright 
lights from the top of the mobile watchtower and other booms, before announcing 
through bullhorns that activists would be evicted from the park immediately. The activist-
operated live stream video from inside the park shows some occupiers anxiously waiting 
for the police to move in, while others are busy trying to remove personal items from 
inside their tents. Some of the activists voluntarily left the encampment before police 
raided those remaining in park. All this was visible for approximately 20 minutes in real 
time coverage from the live stream camera moving around the camp. Activists not 
clearing out their items used the People’s Mic to speak together (Ruby 2012) repeating 
the words of a young man encouraging everyone to remain calm and peaceful. 
Immediately after entering the park, police moved toward the live stream camera in an 
apparent effort to confiscate the camera and complete their control of media coverage. 
Activists set up a skirmish line around the live streaming camera as they tried to make 
sure that the whole world could see what was transpiring. But police quickly broke 
through the line and incapacitated the live stream camera.  
Elsewhere in the park police tore down tarps and tents, including the field kitchen 
and medic station. Some activists were terrified, others defiant, all were vulnerable 
against the body armored, trenchant wielding officers. Police pushed activists to the 
ground with clubs and shields and incapacitated those who resisted with pepper spray. 
Police cuffed in zip ties any activist unable to escape from the park. Over 200 people 
were arrested, removed from the park, placed in vans and transit buses, and taken to 100 
Center Street for processing.  
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The details of what happened next are also hazy, but it appears that police and city 
workers tore down all occupation structures and piled activists’ possessions around the 
perimeter of the park. The debris was then placed in dumpsters and garbage trucks and 
transported away (Democracy Now! 2011a). Almost everything was disposed of 
including tents, cell phones, sleeping bags, laptops, books, clothing, medicine, and eye 
glasses. Next, city workers moved in with pressure washers and cleaned the park before 
erecting a second line of barricades surrounding the park, but inside the curbside 
barricades in place since the early days of the occupation. The concentric barricades 
created a corridor along the sidewalk, but turned Zuccotti Park itself into an exclusionary 
hard zone. Only police officers and private security personnel hired by Brookfield 
Properties, the owner of Zuccotti Park, were allowed access to the park. Police actions 
infuriated the evicted activists and those who had come to the park to show support for 
the movement. Tensions were high. A few hundred police remained on duty standing 
within the park and along both sides of the sidewalk with their backs against the metal 
barricades lining the park boundary and the curb.  
 
Zuccotti Park reopens with controlled access (15 November, Tuesday early afternoon) 
After keeping activists out of the park until early afternoon, police allowed slow 
reentry through two egress points. Those entering the park had to surrender backpacks, 
tents, blankets, sleeping bags, or anything else useful for comfortable reclining and 
sleeping, as well as books, protest literature, and any items that might be used as 
‘weapons.’ By letting people back into the park they converted the hard zone into a soft-
zone3 where confrontations were more likely to happen in the park now closely 
monitored by police and private security personnel.  
Word got out that the park was reopened and more activists converged and 
entered the secured space. Police demanded that people keep moving both outside and 
inside the park. Groups of activists walked together talking and often yelling about their 
park. Throughout the afternoon, police strictly controlled access to the park and the area 
around it. In addition, the location of egress points were shifted or closed for a period of 
time. Several private security guards dressed in bright yellow shirts and jackets worked 
with the police to search activists for items now prohibited in the park.  
As the sun set behind a row of skyscrapers near where the World Trade Center 
once stood, approximately 100 activists started to march together around the park 
chanting ‘Whose park? Our park!’ An hour later large numbers of activists entered the 
park to hold their first GA since being evicted from in the place they could no longer call 
home. After the meeting was adjourned many activists left in order to ready themselves 
for a direct action scheduled to occur 36 hours later. A small group of activists circulated 
throughout the park that night. Whenever they tried to lie down, security guards would 
ask them to move and police escorted those outside who refused to listen to the security 
guards. 
 
OWS second month anniversary – a three course meal (17 November, Thursday) 
A call to action circulated for days before the second month anniversary of OWS 
called for three main events using the metaphor of a three course meal (Occupy Wall 
                                                      
3 Soft zones are public spaces usually adjacent to hard zones where First Amendment rights are temporarily 
curtailed (Gillham 2011). 
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Street 2011b). For ‘breakfast,’ many hundreds of activists converged on Wall Street to 
participate in a well-planned N17 direct action meant to delay the opening of the NYSE, 
banking and related business by preventing Wall Street employees from getting to work. 
Activists intended to set up blockades at five entry points into the financial hub (see Map 
2). At approximately 7:00 AM about 500 activists gathered in front of the Marine 
Midland Building at 140 Broadway across the street from Zuccotti Park. Also, three 
marches with 50 to 100 people in each converged at 140 Broadway shortly after 7:00. 
Those waiting there joined a march and quickly proceeded to streets that intersected Wall 
Street. One group marched down Broadway where they tried to establish a nonviolent 
blockade at the main entrance to Wall Street. They were met by a contingent of 50 or 
more police standing in front of barricades with news reporters, cameras and studio lights 
propped on stage, providing an excellent view from behind the barricades looking over 
the heads of police and facing out at the approaching march.  
[MAP 2 ABOUT HERE] 
At this location, police used shields and batons to push the marchers further south 
where they ran into another group of police blocking the entrance to Exchange Place, 
home to the NYSE. From there activists fled south past the heavily fortified bull and then 
turned left onto Beaver Street where they tried to reach their blockade points by doubling 
back north at Broad, Williams and Water Streets which all intersect Wall Street. But 
police were ready there as well having created a 12-block hard zone around the heart of 
the financial center that extended south of the area where activists hoped to set up their 
blockades. Realizing that they could not pierce the barricades and police lines stacked in 
front and behind the barricades, activists split into smaller groups and ran back and forth 
to the differing access points blocked by police. Dramatic exchanges happened between 
police and protesters in these soft-zones of contention. Police tackled activists running 
past them or broke up blockades of protesters sitting with their arms linked, pulling away 
one person at time. Once activists had been detained, officers carried or dragged them 
behind police lines where they were cuffed in zip ties and placed in a van. 
As activists intentionally ran or were pushed from one place to another by police, 
there were short breaks in the action. During these breaks police let Wall Street workers 
with proper credentials enter the secured zone. Nobody else was allowed in. Similar 
clashes happened to the north and east of Wall Street when marchers from the other two 
groups, and activists acting independently of the marches tried to set up blockades at 
other entrance points to the hard zone. Activists took copious video footage of their 
interactions with police in these soft zones and shamed officers every time they laid 
hands on protesters. Around 11:00 AM, the protests began to break up as activists 
realized that police were adequately prepared to keep them from establishing blockades 
anywhere near Wall Street. Fortunately for activists, the day had only just begun; they 
still had lunch and dinner to look forward to. In all, police arrested over 150 people 
during the breakfast direct action (Newman 2011). 
‘Lunch’ started at 3 PM and entailed occupying subway cars and 16 subway hubs 
where those ‘hardest-hit’ by the recession used the People's Mic to tell their stories to 
passersby. News media reported the events were boisterous, but sparsely attended. At 
about the same time, several hundred activists, many of them students, gathered for an 
unpermitted rally at Union Square. From there they marched south towards Foley Square 
where ‘dinner’ would be served.  
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The dinner menu included a permitted rally by thousands of unionists and 
occupiers followed by a march across the Brooklyn Bridge to hold a GA uniting former 
occupiers of Zuccotti Park with activists from the Brooklyn Occupation. Police followed 
marchers from Union Square in cars, on scooters and in helicopters. Most of the marchers 
successfully made it to Foley Square in time for the union sponsored rally at 5 PM where 
they were received a hero’s welcome from a large crowd as they entered Foley Square 
led by a brass band and drummers. To researchers at the rally the police appeared to use 
barricades to direct people to enter only from the Northwest corner of the square. Rally 
goers explained that the barricaded route extended their walk by many blocks and forced 
them to stand waiting as narrowing barricades created choke points that slowed entrance 
to the rally. Because of the extended walk, many people arrived at the rally already tired.  
Police set up an equally challenging series of barricades leading south out of 
Foley Plaza defining the march route to the Brooklyn Bridge. In essence, police used the 
barricade system to create free speech zones—the places between the barricades where 
activists were able to congregate—and turned other public space into hard zones where 
they could not travel. In some instances groups of protesters frustrated by the 
constraining barricades pushed hard against them or tried to dismantle them, resulting in 
shoving matches with scores of officers located on the opposite side of the barricades. 
Shortly after 6:00 PM the rally-goers started marching south towards the 
Brooklyn Bridge. At the front of the march about 60 union activists were arrested for 
stepping into the roadway near the entrance to the bridge. Barricades forced the large 
crowd to march in just half of the street. This constrained and slowed the crowd, forcing 
the marchers to stand still in the street for long periods.  
At a point about one hour’s walk from the rally location, which normally would 
have taken just a few minutes had there been no police barricades and choke chutes, 
police set up a large arena of barricades with exit points. This provided marchers the first 
opportunity in hours to exit the free-speech zone without risking arrest by climbing over a 
barricade. By that point many, cold and exhausted, took the chance to leave before 
entering another barricaded “free-speech” route leading to the Brooklyn Bridge. 
Thousands walked across the bridge and rallied for the GA, although clearly not as many 
people as had participated in the earlier rally. The GA concluded the official events of the 
day. 
 
Discussion 
By choosing not to pre-plan and pre-negotiate protest events with the authorities, 
the occupation movement posed a new and substantial challenge to police agencies. In 
rising to meet that challenge, police agencies have more fully utilized the repertoire of 
strategic incapacitation and thus made its emerging implications for American society 
more apparent. We focus on three of those here: conflicts over the use of space for 
political protest, over the now extensive police use of surveillance, and over the 
production and dissemination of potentially ‘undesirable’ information.  
 
Spatial containment 
Because police now seldom negotiate in advance with protesters about when and 
where protest events will take place, police exert far more energy and effort to control 
space by pre-determining where citizens can protest and from where media can observe 
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those protests. As the descriptive analysis above indicates the police extensively utilized 
the repertoire of strategic incapacitation in their efforts to control where demonstrations 
and protests would take place by dividing public and private spaces into four types of 
securitized zones. Typically such decisions are made without advance communication 
with protest organizers beyond the issuance of police directives. 
 
Hard zones 
From day one of the occupation, NYPD created hard zones to prevent activists from 
accessing and disrupting the target of their grievances. The chief example of this is 
depicted in Map 2 which shows the perimeter of a twelve square block hard zone 
surrounding the core financial district of Lower Manhattan on 17 November. Similarly, 
two months earlier when activists sought to set up an encampment at Chase Manhattan 
Plaza, police encircled the plaza with steel barricades and a line of officers.  After 
protesters had established the encampment in Zuccotti Park, officers routinely erected 
barricades in and around Wall Street, particularly at major intersections and cross streets 
leading onto Wall Street. Even the iconic bronze bull, long a symbol of finance 
capitalismwas protected against symbolic repurposing, vandalism or worse by barricades 
and a 24-hour security detail. Hard zone borders are frequently sites of contention 
(Noakes, Klocke and Gillham 2005), yet controlling them is a key tactic in  police efforts 
to exert spatial control over public protest.  
Free-speech zones 
Besides attempting to prevent protester usage of public spaces for political 
expression through the establishment of hard zones, the NYPD also created free-speech 
zones or areas where protest was allowed to legally occur. OWS activists generally 
elected not to limit their actions to free-speech zones, choosing instead to engage in 
transgressive and sometimes illegal actions. For example, on 17 September, after police 
had successfully repelled activist efforts to enter Wall Street they tried to direct protesters 
into a free-speech zone surrounded by barricades near Exchange Place and Broadway. 
OWS protesters declined and instead went to Zuccotti Park where they began their two-
month occupation. By rejecting the police delimited free-speech zone, the protesters 
converted Zuccotti Park to one of their own making. The NYPD allowed Zuccotti Park to 
remain a free-speech zone until the mid-November eviction. At that time they cleared 
Zuccotti Park converting it temporarily into a hard zone before re-opening it the next day 
as a soft zone. The also created free-speech zones in the areas between barricades such as 
the large permitted rally near City Hall and march across the Brooklyn Bridge on 17 
November. When police create free-speech zones with constraining barriers and long 
approaches that raise the costs of protest by making it uncomfortable and exhausting, 
they actively deter citizens from democratic and legally sanctioned activities. 
 
Soft zones 
Adjacent to hard zones, the NYPD also created soft zones in which they suspend 
First Amendment rights and where most direct clashes with protesters occurred. If hard 
zones are strategic incapacitation’s vinegar, then soft zones are its honey. Any individual, 
whether a bystander or a journalist, who enters a soft zone effectively, even if 
unwittingly, declares themselves to be a trangressive protester.  One’s presence outside 
the designated free-speech zone and inside a soft zone provides police with sufficient 
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rationale to suspend their rights to voice dissent and to assemble. Police incapacitated 
activists in these soft zones by arresting them or by using force (usually with “less lethal” 
weapons). This incapacitation tactic was used frequently. For example, on October 17 
during the Times Square occupation, at a location near the southern end of the hard-zone 
created on Broadway, police clashed with several protesters pushing up against the 
barricades. After pepper spraying the activists, police quickly arrested them for disorderly 
conduct. Later that same night police in squad formation literally pushed activists out of 
Washington Square Park and then continued to push the crowd several blocks away from 
the park, even though they were on the public sidewalk. Those who refused to move 
along were pushed violently by police at the front of the squad. Twenty minutes of 
unrelenting pushing by the police eventually dispersed the activists.  
Free press zones 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, we identified the utilization by police of a 
fourth type of zone. Free press zones are locations preselected by the police into which 
they direct or forcefully relocate reporters away from the other zones. This incapacitation 
tactic severely constrains or prevents reporters from freely and directly covering police 
actions or protest events. Police use of this tactic was most vivid the night OWS 
protesters were evicted from Zuccotti Park. NYPD actively rounded up members of the 
press, escorted them to a pre-determined location removed from the park, and detained 
them there until the eviction was completed. The free-speech zone appears to have been 
used that night to facilitate police efforts to forcefully incapacitate protesters and actively 
manage public perceptions of the event, though the official explanation for the forced 
relocation was to ensure the safety of the press corps.4 The establishment of this fourth 
type of zone is a significant extension of the strategic incapacitation repertoire of protest 
control, and one that merits closer examination because it directly affects the broader 
citizenry’s access to information and capacity to make informed decisions in a 
democratic society.  
 
Surveillance 
The cessation of pre-event negotiations formerly conducted through the 
permitting process has left police agencies knowing less about protesters and their plans. 
To compensate police agencies have greatly increased their use of surveillance both 
during protest events and between them. Surveillance entails the collection of real time 
and static data which is subsequently ‘mined’ for actionable ‘intelligence.’ Recent 
technological innovations expanded real-time surveillance capabilities exponentially 
enabling the collection of an almost unlimited number of images and sounds not filtered 
through the officer in the field (Marx 2002). Closed circuit TV cameras are deployed 
outside police designated hard zones and legally sanctioned free-speech zones. 
Authorities routinely align protest routes with preexisting CCTV infrastructure and 
supplement CCTV with police videographers on rooftops, behind barricades, on 
scaffolding and in cherry pickers adjacent to protest sites. Real-time images sent to a 
                                                      
4 Major media outlets including the New York Times have since jointly filed a formal complaint with the 
NYPD Deputy Commissioner, the official who issues press credentials, stating that the relocation of 
reporters and photographers to the “press pen” and related activities were “more hostile to the press than 
any other event in recent memory” and clearly violated NYPD’s own policies concerning the press (See 
http://www.nypressclub.org/docs/2011-11-21-DCPI-Letter.pdf). 
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central command center inform real time deployment officers in the field and are 
subsequently ‘data mined’ to neutralize or incapacitate future unruly protesters 
(Fernandez 2008, Gillham 2011).  
Occupation activists were under high-tech police surveillance around the clock 
from the mobile Watch Tower located at one end of Zuccotti Park. Protesters were also 
observed by cameras attached to the boom of a mobile unmanned surveillance vehicle 
parked at the end of the park opposite the Watch Tower as well as by NYPD fixed 
surveillance cameras located around the park. In addition, police monitored the area by 
accessing privately owned security cameras directed into public spaces. Activists 
reported that uniformed police officers stationed outside the park routinely queried them 
for identification and sometimes frisking them or looking through their backpacks or 
bags. TARU officers filmed activists entering and leaving the park, during GAs, and 
occasionally walked inside the park to record conversations occurring between activists.  
Of particular interest is the Watch Tower which melds video cameras and the 
keen eye of officers posted in the tower cabin observing the park from a 25-foot perch. 
Manufacturer specifications of the mobile tower (ICx 2012) indicate its cameras have 
advanced thermal imagining capabilities, allowing police to see at night and to observe 
inside tents and sleeping bags. Finally, activists likely were constantly monitored by the 
extensive CCTV network in Lower Manhattan and possibly by a partially constructed one 
in Mid-Town. The array of surveillance methods deployed to incapacitate OWS 
protesters recalls the well-known arguments of Foucault and Bentham about the way self-
control can be internalized among those who do not know whether or not they are being 
observed. This impressive repertoire of surveillance methods also helps police control the 
dissemination of information, discussed below. 
 
Information management 
A final facet of strategic incapacitation involved a variety of activities by NYPD 
intended to manage information dissemination and production. Police collected 
substantial amounts of information about OWS protesters through a vast array of 
surveillance technologies and police officers discussed above. We do not know where 
this information was consolidated though the Lower Manhattan Security Coordination 
Center and the Central Intelligence Office at One Police Plaza are plausible contenders. 
Once intelligence data was compiled, analyzed and evaluated the NYPD could prevent 
both protester and public access to it while easily sharing relevant material internally and 
with other law enforcement agencies through the network of local, state and national 
police agencies linked by DHS sponsored “fusion centers” in each state (Newkirk 2010, 
Gillham 2011). 
City officials and police also sought to manage the production of information 
about activists and about themselves relying on public relations techniques. The NYPD 
actively shaped the production of information by the press and other commentators by 
framing OWS protesters as potential or actual threats to American society and national 
security. At various times between the start of the occupation and the forcible eviction of 
protesters from Zuccotti Park, public officials and NYPD spokespersons referred to 
occupiers as ‘outsiders’ and sometimes as ‘violent’ towards police. Moreover, OWS 
grievances were frequently characterized as unrealistic, incoherent, overly simplistic, part 
of a ‘blame game,’ job destroying, and harmful to those ‘struggling to make ends meet.” 
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The Zuccotti encampment was referred to as a den of criminal activity including sex 
crimes, drug use, and gang-related activity as well as a dumping ground for the 
chronically homeless, mentally ill, and unemployed ‘who just needed to get a job’ 
According to officials with the health department and fire department the park had also 
become an overcrowded, unsanitary and dangerous and fire hazards (For partial list of 
health and safety complaints filed by city officials see Newman and Goodman 2011). In 
short, the OWS protesters were portrayed to the press and the public as the very 
embodiment of just about every negative stereotype known to inspire public antipathy. 
By contrast, authorities portrayed themselves in a universally positive light. The Mayor 
was portrayed as a First Amendment champion and proud supporter of capitalism and the 
financial district. Police portrayed themselves as unbiased defenders of activists’ civil 
liberties and as protecting the public with professionalism and restraint from the 
undesirable, disruptive and potentially dangerous occupiers.  
It is worth re-emphasizing here that the establishment of a ‘free press zone’  not 
only limited the production and dissemination of news by a third party, but also enabled 
police to frame the events of that night uncontested by competing or impartial voices. In 
so doing the police did not so much censor the press by banning or prohibiting the 
dissemination of certain, objectionable content. Rather, they constrained the ability of the 
press to produce such information in the first place by denying them access to the events 
in question. Thus, post-eviction portrayals of the eviction tended to come from either the 
protesters or the police with no ‘neutral’ or ‘objective’ press portrayals to help adjudicate 
questions in the public mind. 
 
Conclusion 
National response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks accelerated the adoption and 
refinement of a new repertoire of protest control called ‘strategic incapacitation’ which 
scholars contend has become an increasingly common repertoire of protest control 
employed by law enforcement agencies nationwide. As a result police-protester relations 
have become more adversarial with greatly diminished trust, cooperation and 
communication. The full contours of strategic incapacitation have yet to be mapped and 
are currently not well understood in part because of its relative newness and emergent 
character, but also because until OWS police had not confronted sustained transgressive 
protests. Through its first two months the occupation movement utilized transgressive 
tactics to an extent unprecedented in the US since the 1970s. 
The occupation movement’s sustained use of transgressive tactics has magnified 
this dynamic hastening the evolution and diffusion of strategic incapacitation and raising 
new and controversial questions about civil liberties and the legitimacy of protest 
policing tactics. As reflected in our description of events, activists and police were very 
aware of the other’s actions and their back-and-forth interaction clearly shaped the 
evolution of events. The sustained use of transgressive tactics by OWS protesters drove 
the NYPD to further refine and extend their utilization of strategic incapacitation. Just as 
surely activists will devise new ways to resist and mitigate police efforts to incapacitate 
them. This iterative and interactive process in which police and protesters alike adapt to 
one another by updating old tactics and creating new ones intended to resist and mitigate 
those of their opponents should be the focus of subsequent research. Further, additional 
research is warranted into the ways strategic incapacitation actually undermines 1st 
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Amendment activity even for those who engage in the permitting process meant to ensure 
they are in compliance with the law. When extensive ‘free-speech’ corridors exhaust, 
rather than invigorate those engaging in political behavior, and when excessive 
surveillance and concerns about how information might be used stifles public protest, 
researchers must ask how police can possibly balance their joint obligation to help 
maintain public order and protect democracy from the police themselves.  
The issues are not limited to the United States. Police and protest tactics at large 
international events since the 1999 WTO protests in Seattle have diffused interactively 
and transnationally (della Porta and Tarrow 2012). On the police side, authorities across 
the globe actively share information about control tactics  perceived to be effective 
against the innovative tactical repertoire of a “new breed” of protester. Della Porta and 
Tarrow (2012) have documented the widespread use of  tactics central to strategic 
incapacitation--such as massive police presence, the use of barriers, preventive arrests, 
and the use of less lethal weapons—in nearly all mass transnational events between 1999-
2003, regardless of the nation in which they were held. Moreover, studies of protest 
policing of more local events have identified the use of parts of the strategic 
incapacitation policing repertoire in nations such as Sweden (Wahlstrom 2010) and 
Scotland (Gorringe, et al. 2011). Similarly, elements of strategic incapacitation appear to 
be diffusing into the policing of non-protest events like large motorcycle festivals and 
various celebratory gatherings in university towns.  Further research is needed to 
determine the extent to which strategic incapacitation tactics have diffused to other 
democratic nations as well as to the routine policing of large, non-political gatherings 
within the United States. 
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Map 1: Locations of Major Occupy Wall Street Protest Events 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Legend 
 
1 = Zuccotti Park 7 = Brooklyn Bridge 
2 = Bull at Bowling Green Park 8 = Washington Square Park 
3 = Wall Street 9 = Times Square 
4 = Chase Manhattan Plaza 10 = Foley Square 
5 = 5th Ave & East 14th Street 11 = City Hall 
6 = Union Square  
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Map 2. Location of Occupy Wall Street Planned Blockades, 
Police Hard Zone, and Other Places of Significance, N17 
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